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Asking whether the modern administrative state is unconstitutional is like asking 
whether Yale Law School has a tendency to emphasize theory.  “Yes” really does not do 
justice to the question.  The modern administrative state is not merely unconstitutional; it 
is anti-constitutional.  The Constitution was designed specifically to prevent the 
emergence of the kinds of institutions that characterize the modern administrative state.  
Just consider that during the founding era, the grand constitutional disputes about 
administration involved such matters as whether Congress’s enumerated power to 
“establish Post Offices and post Roads”1 allowed Congress to create new post roads or 
merely to designate existing state-created roads as postal routes2 and whether Congress 
could let the President or Postmaster determine the location of postal routes or instead 
had to itself designate the routes town by town.3   
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful to the Abraham and Lillian Benton 
Fund for support.  This paper is the extended version of remarks delivered at the Federalist Society’s 2009 
Student Symposium entitled  “Separation of Powers in American Constitutionalism,” held at Yale Law 
School on February 27-28, 2009. 
 
1   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 
2   See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 6, 1796), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 28 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (limiting the postal road power to the 
ability to “select from those [roads] already made, those on which there shall be a post”).  The debate over 
the scope of the postal power extended throughout the nation’s first half-century, with Thomas Jefferson 
and James Monroe, inter alia, arguing that Congress had no power to create new roads and James Madison 
and Joseph Story, inter alia, taking the other side.  The issue divided the Supreme Court as late as 1845.  
For a brief account of the debate, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal 
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
 
3   See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 49-50 (4th ed. 2007).  The Second Congress, after 
debate, elected to designate the routes town by town.  See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. VII, § 1, 1 Stat. 232. 
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The founders of the modern administrative state understood full well what they 
were up against.  James Landis’s rants against the Constitution in The Administrative 
Process are by now well known to administrative law students and scholars.4  Just as 
revealing are the remarks of Frank Goodnow in 1911, when Progressives were still 
struggling to give administrative governance a firm foothold in the American system: 
. . . [S]pecial care was taken [in the Constitution] to secure the recognition of the 
fact that the new government was one only of enumerated powers, and that 
powers not granted to such government were reserved to the states or to the 
people. 
 
For one reason or another the people of the United States came soon to 
regard with an almost superstitious reverence the document into which this 
general scheme of government was incorporated . . . . 
 
. . . The question naturally arises before those who have no belief in a 
static political society or in permanent political principles of universal application 
. . . -- Is the kind of political system which we commonly believe our fathers 
established one which can with advantage be retained unchanged in the changed 
conditions which are seen to exist?5 
 
These thinkers grasped that in order to validate the administrative state, you either need a 
new Constitution, which modern scholars have proven willing to supply in abundance,6 or 
a new theory of constitutionalism, which has obligingly emerged under the name of 
                                                 
4   See, e.g,, JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2, 10, 12 (1938). 
 
5   FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 9-11 (1911).  For additional examples of 
Progressive awareness of constitutional problems with the formation of the modern administrative state, see 
R.J. Pestritto, The Progressive Origins of the Administrative State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis, 24 
SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y 16 (2007). 
 
6   Some are willing to supply it directly.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).  
Others do so indirectly by substituting for the Constitution precedents or practices, see, e.g., David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996), or philosophical 
constructs, see, e.g.,JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF 
AUTONOMY (2006) (arguing for a “constructivist” interpretative methodology that builds from the 
principles that best explain and justify a given set of fundamental legal materials).  Of course, if the 
Constitution itself contemplated its own replacement by such norms, that would be fine as an interpretative 
matter.  But it does not.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1 (declaring “[t]his Constitution” to be the “the 
supreme Law of the Land”) (emphasis added). 
 
“functionalism” – an interpretative theory that effectively takes the administrative state as 
its starting point and goes on from there.7  Whatever method of validation the champions 
of modern governance choose, the Constitution of 1788 is the obstacle that must be 
avoided or obliterated. 
As a practical matter, of course, the New Deal cemented the administrative state 
firmly in place, and we remain in that cement -- Jimmy-Hoffa-like -- to this day.  My 
goal in this Essay is not to dissolve that cement but merely to demonstrate the purely 
factual proposition that the administrative state has buried the Constitution beneath it. 
To gauge just how far modern administration has veered from the Constitution, 
consider as a representative case study the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008,8 enacted on October 3, 2008, which created the “Troubled Assets Relief Program” 
(“TARP”).  Stripping away two hundred pages of pork, tax preferences, and various 
oversight, reporting, and fast-track provisions, the substance of the TARP legislation is 
quite simple.  Section 101(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury “to purchase . . . 
troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are 
determined by the Secretary.”9  Troubled assets are “(A) residential and commercial 
mortgages and any securities, obligations or other instruments that are based on or related 
to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 
2008, the purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes financial market stability; 
and (B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the 
                                                 
7   For an account of functionalism as a rationalization for the administrative state, see Gary Lawson, 
Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation of Powers and the Transcendental 
Deduction, 49 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 885 (2005). 
 
8   Pub. L. No. 110-343, -- Stat. – (2008). 
 
9   Id. § 101(a)(1). 
 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the 
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability . . . .”10  The 
Secretary is further empowered “to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to 
carry out the authorities in this Act . . . .”11  That is the sum total of the operative legal 
authority under which $750 billion has been spent. 
This statute is a constitutional monstrosity, and many of the problems with it are 
endemic to the modern administrative state.  Congress had no power to enact the program 
in the first place, Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine when enacting it, 
Congress and the President may have violated the Appointments Clause in the bargain, 
and President Bush grossly exceeded his constitutional  “executive Power” when 




To an originalist who is unconcerned about precedent, practice, politics, or 
anything other than the meaning of the Constitution,12 the most obvious constitutional 
problem with this legislation is that there is no “troubled assets” clause in the 
                                                 
10   Id. § 3(9). 
 
11   Id. § 101(c). 
 
12   As Lancelot modestly observed, “c’est moi.”  To be precise: The meaning of the Constitution is the 
meaning that would have been attributed to it by a fully informed hypothetical observer at the time of its 
ratification.  See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 47, 77 n.79 (2006).  Precedent may be an important feature of the scheme of governance 
that has historically emerged from the constitutional order, but it is not part of or constitutive of the 
Constitution’s meaning.  See Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent 
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007).  The meaning is a fact irrespective of its normative significance.  
See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997). 
 
Constitution.  There is a copyright clause,13 a bankruptcy clause,14 a weights and 
measures clause,15 and even an offenses against the law of nations clause,16 but no clause 
authorizing Congress to empower the national government to become a gargantuan 
mortgage broker.  Buying mortgages or mortgage-backed securities is not a regulation of 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, or with the Indian tribes.17  It is 
not the punishment of counterfeiting,18 the granting of a letter of marque and reprisal,19 a 
needful regulation of the territory or other property belonging to the United States,20 or 
anything else that remotely comes within the enumerations of powers of Congress in the 
Constitution.  Nor is it a law “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”21 any of 
these powers.  What granted power does it necessarily and properly carry into execution? 
There is in fact an obvious modern answer to this last question (if any modern 
person even deigns to acknowledge the question).  The TARP statute spends money -- a 
whole heaping lot of money – so surely the Spending Clause plainly authorizes the Act.  
That might be a good answer if the Constitution actually contained a Spending Clause.  
But as it happens, there is no provision in the Constitution specifically dedicated to 
                                                 
13   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 
14   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 
15   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 
16   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 
17   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 
18   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
 
19   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 
20   Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 
21   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 
authorizing federal spending.  There are several clauses in the Constitution that quite 
sensibly and correctly assume that Congress somewhere has the power to spend, such as 
the provision stipulating that no money may be withdrawn from the Treasury except 
pursuant to a valid appropriation,22 but none of these provisions itself authorizes federal 
spending.  The provision most often cited in modern law as a Spending Clause23 is 
actually nothing of the sort.  Article I, section 8, clause 1 provides that “Congress shall 
have power [t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposes and Excises, to pay the debts and 
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, 
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”24  Notwithstanding 
the existence of a substantial body of jurisprudence and scholarship treating this 
provision as a spending clause, it is a taxing clause and nothing more.  The only power 
granted by this clause is the power to lay and collect taxes.  The clause then specifies the 
purposes for which taxes may be laid and collected.  That is an important specification, 
because it makes clear that taxes can be used for purposes other than raising revenue, 
such as protectionism or other regulatory objectives,25 but the clause confers no power to 
spend the money raised through taxes, much less a free-standing power to promote the 
general welfare through spending or other means.  In the case of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act, it is particularly dicey to try to infer the power to spend from 
                                                 
22    Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 
23   See,e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). 
 
24   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 
25   This specification addressed a contentious issue in eighteenth-century theories of taxation.  For a full 
account of the Taxing Clause, see the magisterial Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the 
President’s Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 
8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 33 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999). 
 
the power to tax, because a big chunk of the bailout money will come from borrowing 
rather than taxation, and good luck inferring a power to spend borrowed money from the 
Taxing Clause.26 
The power to spend in the Constitution comes from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause: appropriations laws can be “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 
other federal powers.27  But then, in the context of the TARP program, one has to find 
some enumerated power that appropriations to buy mortgages can necessarily and 
properly carry into execution.  If the words “necessary and proper” have any meaning at 
all, and thus require anything more than a delusional connection between the 
appropriations law and an enumerated federal power,28 this is an impossible task.  The 
entire TARP enterprise was unconstitutional from the get-go. 
In the modern administrative state, the only thing exceptional about the TARP 
spending program is its size.  The administrative state routinely spends money on matters 
entirely unconnected to any enumerated federal power; indeed, by almost any measure, 
                                                 
26   I am indebted to David Engdahl for this simple but profound insight.  See David E. Engdahl, The Basis 
of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 215, 222 (1995) (“the spending allusion in the Taxing 
Clause doe not even colorably reach borrowed sums”).  See also David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 
44 DUKE L.J. 1, 49 (1994) (“nothing in the Taxing Clause even implicitly contemplates spending such 
funds [from sales of land or other property]”). 
 
27   Professor Engdahl has tried to locate the federal spending power in the Property Clause, which 
empowers Congress “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  See Engdahl, The Basis 
of the Spending Power, supra note 30.  For a structural critique of this argument and a defense of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as the most plausible source of federal spending power, see GARY LAWSON & 
GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
27-32 (2004). 
 
28   Obviously I think that they do, and I have spent much of my professional life arguing for it.  See, e.g., 
Gary Lawson, Discretion As Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242-48 (2005) (explaining that a “necessary” implementing law must have “some 
obvious and precise affinity” with the implemented power); id. at 249-60 (explaining that a “proper” 
implementing law must conform to background understandings of federalism, separation of powers, and 
individual rights). 
 
unconstitutionally spending money is surely the administrative state’s most common 
activity.  Everything from the Social Security Administration to the Department of 
Education to the Federal Emergency Management Agency is a monument to the 
administrative state’s war on the Constitution 
Indeed, the example of FEMA calls forth another instructive comparison with the 
constitutional world of the 1790s.  On November 26, 1796, the city of Savannah was 
devastated by a fire, and Georgia representatives asked Congress for $10,000 in 
government aid.  Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina answered: “[H]e wished gentlemen 
to put their finger upon that part of the Constitution which gave that House power to 
afford them relief . . . .  He felt for the sufferers . . . but he felt as tenderly for the 
Constitution; he had examined it, and it did not authorize any such grant.”29  Andrew 
Moore of Virginia added that “every individual citizen could, if he pleased, show his 
individual humanity by subscribing to their relief; but it was not Constitutional for them 
to afford relief from the Treasury.”30 




Even assuming that Congress somehow has the power to turn the Treasury 
Department into a subsidiary of Countrywide, the statutory authorization to the Treasury 
                                                 
29   6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1717 (1796) (statement of Nathaniel Macon). 
 
30   Id. at 1718 (statement of Andrew Moore). 
 
in the TARP program violates the constitutional nondelegation principle.  It is critical to 
understand from where that principle comes and what it entails.31 
The Constitution’s nondelegation principle flows from the more basic principle of 
enumerated powers.  Any federal actor or institution can only exercise those powers 
granted to them pursuant to the Constitution.  The President, and through him the 
Treasury Secretary, is given “[t]he executive Power,” which is quintessentially the power 
to execute laws, not the power to make laws. Lawmaking is generally the purview of the 
legislative power, a subset of which is vested in “a Congress of the United States.”32  The 
executive’s only shares in this general lawmaking power are the President’s presentment 
and veto power in Article I, section 733 and the Vice President’s ability to break ties in the 
Senate.34  If executive actors are making laws, they are not exercising the only powers 
granted to them by the Constitution. 
To be sure, drawing distinctions among legislative, executive, and judicial power, 
especially at the margins, can cause nasty problems that, as James Madison put it, “prove 
the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in 
political science.”35  To which the Constitution responds: “Get over it.”  The Constitution 
                                                 
31   The long form of the following brief argument is found in Lawson, supra note 28; Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.327 (2002). 
 
32   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress).  One must say 
“generally” because there are specific contexts in which the executive power does include what can only be 
described as a lawmaking component: the President may (and, as a matter of international law, must) 
govern occupied territory during wartime, exercising what looks to the outside world like legislative power.  
See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 122-23 (2004). 
 
33   Id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3. 
 
34   Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 
35   THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 
separately identifies legislative power, executive power, and judicial power, and it is 
therefore incumbent upon honest interpreters to do the best that they can with those 
distinctions, however tough it might be.36 
It can be very tough.  Some element of discretion in implementation and 
interpretation is inherent in executive and judicial powers, so some element of ambiguity 
in statutes is perfectly consistent with the exercise of non-legislative powers by those 
who must apply the laws.  You can execute by interpreting.  You can also “interpret” in 
such a way as to make law, and therein lies the conceptual problem.  Whether any 
particular enactment confers the kind and quality of discretion that crosses the line from 
permissible ambiguity to impermissible delegation is a question of degree and judgment.  
As Chief Justice Marshall put it way back in 1825, one must distinguish “those important 
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less 
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to 
act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”37   Two centuries of scholarship 
and judicial doctrine have not improved upon this vague and circular formulation38 – 
which is no doubt why many conservatives, such as Justice Scalia, flee from the 
nondelegation doctrine as vampires flee garlic.39  To which the Constitution once again 
says, “Get over it.”  The Constitution does not always instantiate “the rule of law as the 
                                                 
36   Madison himself later noted the possibility and necessity of “discriminating, therefore, in theory, the 
several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary . . . .”   Id., No. 
48, at 308 (James Madison). 
 
37   Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (emphasis added). 
 
38   For the long list of failed attempts to come up with something better than Chief Justice Marshall’s 
formulation, see Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note XX, at 355-77. 
 
39   See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (effectively declaring 
the nondelegation doctrine nonjusticiable). 
 
law of rules”40 by providing clear answers with no need for judgment.  If you truly dance 
with who brung ya, you have to accept the fact that the Constitution prescribes a fuzzy 
standard rather than a crisp rule for determining when legislation unconstitutionally 
delegates legislative power. 
Nor can Congress perform an end run around the nondelegation principle through 
the Necessary and Proper Clause by, for example, passing a vague statute and then 
specifically instructing executive agents to fill in the meaning, so that the act of 
interpretative “lawmaking” will formally be execution of a statute.41  Statutes under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause must be “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 
other federal powers, and a statute that tries to turn an executive (or judicial) agent into a 
lawmaker is not “proper for carrying into Execution” those powers.  Or put another way, 
the executive power is best read not as a purely formal power to implement statutes but 
rather as a power to implement statutes that do not confer the kind and quality of 
discretion that would convert the executive actor into a lawmaker.  Far from authorizing 
delegations, the Necessary and Proper Clause is a textual vehicle through which the 
nondelegation doctrine is constitutionalized. 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorizes the Treasury Secretary to 
purchase any mortgages or mortgage-backed securities originated on or before March 14, 
2008 “the purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes financial market 
stability.”  On its face, this looks like a rank delegation to the Secretary.  To be sure, the 
statute does not leave disposition of the funds totally at the discretion of the Secretary.  
                                                 
40   See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 
41   For an attempt to make this kind of argument, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). 
 
The Secretary must “prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions.”42  And the 
Secretary is instructed by Congress to “take into consideration” nine factors (though the 
Secretary does not actually have to do anything specific with these factors other than 
consider them): 
(1) protecting the interests of taxpayers by maximizing overall returns and 
minimizing the impact on the national debt; 
 
(2) providing stability and preventing disruption to financial markets in order to 
limit the impact on the economy and protect American jobs, savings, and 
retirement security; 
 
(3) the need to help families keep their homes and to stabilize communities; 
 
(4) in determining whether to engage in a direct purchase from an individual 
financial institution, the long-term viability of the financial institution in 
determining whether the purchase represents the most efficient use of funds under 
this Act; 
 
(5) ensuring that all financial institutions are eligible to participate in the program, 
without discrimination based on size, geography, form of organization, or the 
size, type, and number of assets eligible for purchase under this Act. 
 
(6) providing financial assistance to financial institutions, including those serving 
low- and moderate-income populations and other underserved communities, and 
that have assets less than $1,000,000,000, that were well or adequately capitalized 
as of June 30, 2008, and that as a result of the devaluation of the preferred 
government-sponsored enterprises stock will drop one or more more capital 
levels, in a manner sufficient to restore the financial institutions to at least an 
adequately capitalized level; 
 
(7) the need to ensure stability for United States public instrumentalities, such as 
counties and cities, that may have suffered significant increased costs or losses in 
the current market turmoil; 
 
(8) protecting the retirement security of Americans by purchasing troubled assets 
held by or on behalf of an eligible retirement plan described in clause (iii), (iv), 
(v), or (vi) of section 402(c)(8)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, except 
that such authority shall not extend to any compensation arrangements subject to 
section 409A of such Code; and 
 
                                                 
42   Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(e). 
 
(9) the utility of purchasing other real estate owned and instruments backed by 
mortgages on multifamily properties.43 
 
Fairly read, these provisions essentially instruct the Secretary to promote goodness and 
niceness and to avoid badness and meanness – which means, in the end, that the statute 
does not actually do anything other than authorize the Secretary to spend three quarters of 
a trillion dollars on mortgages and related securities.  The statute seems on its face to 
delegate authority to the Secretary, and after a closer look that is exactly what it does.  
There certainly seem to be plenty of, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “important 
subjects” left entirely to the Secretary, and that kind of discretion certainly seems to 
exceed the “executive Power” that the Constitution permits the President, and therefore 
the Secretary, to exercise. 
 But, alas, things are not always that simple with the nondelegation doctrine.  
Suppose that Congress appropriates $50 million to the Treasury Department for “office 
operations.”  Is that an unconstitutional delegation unless Congress specifies how many 
paper clips, staplers, and/or secretaries must be purchased with the money?  Lump sum 
appropriations have been around for a very long time, and it would be quite startling even 
to narrow-minded originalists such as myself if Congress had to specify every purchase 
in a line item for every agency.  And if lump sum appropriations of this sort are 
permissible, is TARP all that different? 
 It is different: Distributing funds to bail out the financial industry is an “important 
subject[]” while figuring out whether staplers or paper clips will run the office more 
smoothly is a matter of “less interest.”  Why?  Because.  Ultimately, analysis under the 
nondelegation principle is a matter of judgment rather than deduction, and there is 
                                                 
43   Id. § 103. 
 
nothing to be done about it.  If someone truly judges that the Secretary’s authority under 
TARP does not concern “important subjects,” I really do not know what to say to them. 
As with the spending of money, the only thing noteworthy about the scope of 
discretion granted to the Treasury Secretary in the context of the modern administrative 
state is the size of the relevant budget.  From a constitutional standpoint, the grant of 
authority is routine.  The authorization to buy up mortgages “the purchase of which the 
Secretary determines promotes financial market stability” is no more open ended than, 
for example, the authorization to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency to adopt ambient air quality standards “the attainment of which in the judgment 
of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, 
are requisite to protect the public health.”44  That latter authorization was upheld as 
constitutional by a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia.45  
And the factors that the Secretary of the Treasury are instructed to consider under the 
TARP program are not materially different from the passel of factors and considerations 
that the United States Sentencing Commission was supposed to consider when adopting 
sentencing guidelines under the Sentencing Reform Act of 198446; the Sentencing 
Commission’s authority was found constitutional by an effectively unanimous Court.47 
                                                 
44   42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). 
 
45   See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 
46   See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000). 
 
47   See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).  Justice Scalia dissented because of the peculiar 
function of the Sentencing Commission, but with regard to whether grants of discretion to executive or 
judicial actors could ever be so vague as to violate the nondelegation doctrine, Justice Scalia was, if 
anything, more insistent than was the majority on the fruitlessness of that inquiry. 
 
There are perfectly good reasons why one might want to celebrate the demise of 




Perhaps the most intellectually intriguing constitutional question surrounding the 
TARP program – and it is a question with potentially sweeping consequences for the 
administrative state -- is whether Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulsen was 
constitutionally authorized to administer it during the Bush Administration.  Henry 
Paulsen was sworn in as Treasury Secretary on July 10, 2006 after being confirmed by 
the Senate on June 28, 2006.  Paulsen’s appointment was in full conformance with the 
Constitution’s Appointments Clause;49 he was nominated by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate.  But in what capacity was he confirmed?  The Senate confirmed him as the 
Treasury Secretary, not as the Administrator of the EPA or the Secretary of Defense.  
Suppose that on July 11, 2006, Secretary of the Treasury Paulsen was put in charge of (1) 
establishing ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, (2) running the Iraq 
war effort, and (3) representing the United States in the United Nations.  Could Secretary 
Paulsen lawfully perform those functions by virtue of being confirmed as a federal officer 
under the Appointments Clause?  Or did his appointment and confirmation as Secretary 
of the Treasury only authorize him to perform functions reasonably within the 
contemplation of the appointing authorities, including the Senate that confirmed him? 
                                                 
48   For an especially sophisticated normative defense of delegation, see Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). 
 
49   U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
The question is actually quite profound.  Federal appointees are always confirmed 
in the context of specific sets of statutory authorizations that accompany their offices.  
But Congress often changes those statutory authorizations – by expansion, contraction, or 
modification – during the tenure of the officers.  Do the officers have to be re-appointed 
and (if they require confirmation) re-confirmed each time there is any change at all in 
their duties?  No one has ever thought so; the initial appointment has always been 
understood, quite sensibly, to include the authority to implement new and changed 
statutory authorizations.  But are there any limits to the new authority that can be given to 
an existing officer, either by the President through re-assignment50 or by Congress 
through statutory amendments, and if so, what are those limits?51 
The Supreme Court and the community of separation-of-powers scholars have 
largely managed to duck this question for more than two centuries.  David Stras and Ryan 
Scott, in the only extended academic treatment of this problem of which I am aware,52 
make a good textual and functional case that there must be some limit to the extent to 
which Congress can alter the duties of an officer,53 but like the rest of us they have a hard 
                                                 
50   I am not addressing here the very difficult question whether the President has unilateral authority to 
reassign duties within the executive department.  The case for such a power argues that all “executive 
Power” is vested personally in the President by Article II, so that the President can personally assume and 
then delegate any executive authority located anywhere in the United States government.  The case against 
such a power argues that Congress, by virtue of its Necessary and Proper Clause power to create federal 
offices, can designate which subordinates within the executive department can permissibly exercise certain 
classes of executive power (though Congress cannot, under the theory of the unitary executive, forbid the 
President from personally exercising at least a veto power over any use of federal executive power).  I lean 
towards the latter view, but not for any good reason that I can defend here. 
 
51   Note that a different quorum of the Senate (not to mention a different Senate) might confirm an 
appointee and then participate in changing that appointee’s authority after confirmation. 
 
52   David R. Stras and Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 
496-506 (2007). 
 
53   Textually, they argue that only the President and Senate can appoint principal officers and only the 
President alone, the courts of law, and heads of departments can appoint inferior officers; Congress, 
including the House of Representatives, has no appointment power.  But allowing unlimited changes in and 
time coming up with clear guidance about the nature of that limit.  The Supreme Court 
faced the issue in 1994 in holding that military officers can serve as military judges 
without receiving special appointments for that purpose,54 but appeared to go out of its 
way to decide the case without announcing any broad principles for the future.  In 
particular, the majority assumed without deciding that new duties must be “germane” to 
the pre-existing functions of the officer in order to obviate the need for a new 
appointment (and found that serving as a military judge was “germane” to serving as a 
military officer because “all military officers, consistent, with a long tradition, play a role 
in the operation of the military justice system”55).  Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred 
on the ground that germaneness is the unavoidable key to such questions and that the 
majority had correctly determined that serving as a military judge is germane to military 
officer-dom.56  Justices Scalia and Thomas are, I think, correct that germaneness analysis 
is unavoidable – or at least if anyone has come up with a better term than “germaneness” 
to describe the constitutionally necessary relationship between new duties and an existing 
officeholder’s portfolio of responsibilities, I have not heard it. 
Is administering the TARP statute germane in this sense to the pre-October 2008 
duties of the Secretary of the Treasury?  By the nature of the inquiry, there can be no 
slam-dunk answer, but “no” is at least plausible.  The sheer scope of the program may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
reallocations of the authority of officers would effectively grant Congress appointment power.  Id. at 495.  
Functionally, they argue that unlimited reallocations of power can shift appointment authority from the 
President to Congress and undermine the accountability concerns that underlie the Appointments Clause.  
Id. at 495-96.  I would only add to this that the distinction between principal and inferior officers written 
into the Appointments Clause makes no sense unless each appointed officer has functions defined in some 
fashion by their appointment. 
 
54   See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). 
 
55   Id. at 175. 
 
56   Id. at 196 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
enough to require a new appointment for anyone who is going to administer it, and even 
if scope alone does not do it, the federal government’s purchases of ownership stakes in 
private financial institutions may be sufficiently novel to go beyond the functions of the 
Treasury Secretary that could have been contemplated by a reasonable President or 
Senate in 2006.  At the very least, it seems like a serious question. 
If one acknowledges that the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act presents a 
serious question about the need for a new appointment for Secretary Paulsen, the 
consequences for the administrative state may be quite large.57 Certainly, if one 
retroactively examines the New Deal, it is quite possible that many of the statutes from 
that era that gave authority to existing officers went far beyond the duties for which they 
were confirmed, providing yet another reason (to go along with the numerous more 
obvious ones) why the New Deal was unconstitutional.58  And if we are about to embark 
upon a new New Deal, with ever-increasing forms of government control, the limits of 
the Appointments Clause may be stretched in the process.  At a minimum, it seems like 




                                                 
57   The consequences are obviously larger for those appointees who received or required Senate 
confirmation.  In the case of an inferior officer appointed by the President alone, a novel expansion of 
duties could be accommodated simply by a new presidential appointment, which is really just paper-
pushing.  There is always a chance, however, that someone who starts out as an inferior officer could 
become a principal officer through expansion of duties – as long as the definition of a principal officer 
relies at least in part on the scope of the officer’s duties and not just on the formal chain of command. 
 
58   As an aside, that would also mean that if Bruce Ackerman wants to rescue the New Deal as 
constitutional, his constitutional moment must also involve an amendment to the Appointments Clause. 
 
One further feature of the TARP program during the Bush Administration bears 
mention – not because it has broad lessons for the modern administrative statute but 
because it frosts me more than anything else about the statute. 
When Congress failed to bail out the Big Three automakers and their unions in 
Fall 2008, the Bush Administration on December 19, 2008 unilaterally extended loans 
totaling $13.4 billion to General Motors and Chrysler out of the funds available under the 
TARP program.  Indulge for the moment the assumption that obtaining an IOU from an 
automaker, while not the purchase of a mortgage or mortgage-backed security, is the 
purchase of “any other [non-mortgage-related] financial instrument that the Secretary . . . 
determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability . . . .”  
The more basic problem is that the TARP program only authorizes purchases of assets 
from a “financial institution,” which is defined in the statute as “any institution, 
including, but not limited to, any bank, savings association, credit union, security broker 
or dealer, or insurance company, established and regulated under the laws of the United 
States or any State, territory, or possession of the United States . . . and having significant 
operations in the United States, but excluding any central bank of, or institutions owned 
by, a foreign government.”59  Are automakers really “financial institution[s]”? 
Conceivably, a casual textualist could stop at the words “any institution” in the 
definition of “financial institution” and say that automakers are institutions, so end of 
story.  That reasoning, of course, would also sweep in as “financial institution[s]” antique 
dealers, ballet troupes, and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform 
Now (which I gather is now running away from that name as fast as traditional 
originalists run away from the nondelegation doctrine).  I am as much of a textualist as 
                                                 
59   Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 3(5). 
the next person – probably more so than many of the next people – but if I am 
approaching this text as a reasonable reader, I will interpolate some synonym of the word 
“financial” in between the words “any” and “institution” in the definition of “financial 
institution.”  The grounds for this feat of (as a critic might call it) interpretative 
legislation are that the words “any institution” appear in a definition of “financial 
institution,” the (non-exhaustive) examples given in the statute all have something to with 
finance, the two hundred pages of statute surrounding this definition deal with financial 
matters, and the context in which the statute was enacted fairly screams that “financial 
institution” means institutions that are in some important sense financial.  In all 
likelihood, the financing arms of the automakers – which have obtained loans of their 
own apart from the initial $13.4 billion -- would qualify as financial institutions.  Perhaps 
even pawn shops might make it in.  But automakers are no more “financial institution[s]” 
under this statute than is the New York Times. 
How did President Bush explain the legality of this use of funds?  In his statement 
of December 19, 2008 announcing the auto bailout, he said: “Unfortunately, despite 
extensive debate and agreement that we should prevent disorderly bankruptcies in the 
American auto industry, Congress was unable to get a bill to my desk before adjourning 
this year.  This means the only way to avoid a collapse of the U.S. auto industry is for the 
executive branch to step in . . . .  So today, I’m announcing that the federal government 
will grant loans to auto companies under conditions similar to those Congress considered 
last week.”60  Perhaps I’m missing something, but this seems to be a claim that if the 
President considers something important for the country, the President can do it whether 
                                                 
60   See http://detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081219/AUTO01/812190435/0/AUTO01 (visited 
February 8, 2009). 
 
or not Congress authorizes it by statute.  Presidents have made such claims in the past, 
sometimes with success61 and sometimes meeting strong legal resistance,62 but such 
claims are always totally inappropriate in a constitution of enumerated powers that 
merely gives the President “executive Power.”  The executive power simply does not 
include the power to do anything that the President thinks is important for the country. 
Interestingly, I spent eight years listening to most of the people around me 
complain about an imperial presidency, but I have not heard one peep out of anyone in 
the legal academy decrying this simply outlandish assertion of presidential authority.63 
 
* * * * 
 
The unconstitutionality of large chunks of the modern administrative state is a 
fact.  But it is also a fact that Neptune is occasionally farther from Earth than Pluto.  Both 
facts have about equal relevance in the contemporary legal world.  What does that say 
about the role of the Constitution in modern life?  That, alas, is another conference and 
another paper.  For today, I am just the messenger, and the message is that the 
administrative state and the Constitution do not mix. 
                                                 
61   See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 NW. 
U.L. REV. 581 (2001) (describing successful executive claims of emergency power to govern California 
without statutory authority). 
 
62   See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that the President could 
not seize domestic steel mills during wartime without statutory authorization). 
 
63   Professor Christopher Schroeder assures me that he, too, was appalled by this assertion of presidential 
authority and even drafted an op-ed column about it.  So sincere kudos to Professor Schroeder; he is hereby 
exempted from my tendentious broadside against the left-leaning professoriate. 
 
